n8n-MCP: Cross-tenant access to workflow version backups in multi-tenant HTTP deployments
CVE-2026-54052 · GHSA-j6r7-6fhx-77wx · published 2026-07-14
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS score
- 9.9
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.39%
- Fixed in
- 2.56.1
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
In multi-tenant HTTP deployments — where a single n8n-mcp server serves several tenants — the locally stored workflow version history (the automatic backups taken before workflow updates) was not isolated per tenant. An authenticated tenant could read workflow version snapshots belonging to other tenants, and could delete or destroy other tenants' stored backups. A stored snapshot includes full node definitions, so the exposed data can contain credential references and authorization headers configured on nodes. This is therefore a confidentiality issue in addition to an integrity/availability one.
Upgrade n8n-mcp to 2.56.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
2.56.1. The stored version history is now isolated per instance, so a tenant can only access its own backups. Upgrading runs a one-time migration that isolates existing history and clears previously stored, un-scoped backups (these are auto-created, short-retention backups).
If users cannot upgrade immediately: Disable the workflow version tool by setting DISABLEDTOOLS=n8nworkflow_versions in the server environment (for example, in your Docker .env). This removes the affected tool from the deployment for all tenants; automatic backups are unaffected, but the cross-tenant access path is closed. Alternatively, do not run in multi-tenant mode — serve each tenant from a separate instance with its own database, so no local store is shared between tenants. Restrict network access to the HTTP endpoint to trusted operators. stdio and single-tenant HTTP deployments are not affected.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| n8n-mcp | npm | <= 2.56.0 | 2.56.1 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.