n8n-mcp has authenticated SSRF via instance-URL header in multi-tenant HTTP mode
CVE-2026-39974 · GHSA-4ggg-h7ph-26qr · published 2026-04-08 · updated 2026-04-09
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.32%
- Fixed in
- 2.47.4
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
An authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in n8n-mcp allows a caller holding a valid AUTHTOKEN to cause the server to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs supplied through multi-tenant HTTP headers. Response bodies are reflected back through JSON-RPC, so an attacker can read the contents of any URL the server can reach — including cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), internal network services, and any other host the server process has network access to. The primary at-risk deployments are multi-tenant HTTP installations where more than one operator can present a valid AUTHTOKEN, or where a token is shared with less-trusted clients.
Upgrade n8n-mcp to 2.47.4 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
n8n-mcp 2.47.4 and later.
If you cannot immediately upgrade: 1. Egress filtering at the network layer — block outbound traffic from the n8n-mcp container to RFC1918 ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16), link-local 169.254.0.0/16, and any other internal ranges. This defends against any future SSRF-class issue and is recommended even after upgrading. 2. Disable multi-tenant headers — if your deployment does not require per-request instance switching, unset ENABLEMULTITENANT and do not accept x-n8n-url / x-n8n-key headers at the reverse proxy. 3. Restrict AUTHTOKEN distribution** — ensure the bearer token is only held by fully trusted operators until you can upgrade.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| n8n-mcp | npm | <= 2.47.3 | 2.47.4 |
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- CriticalSSRF + LLM API key exfiltration via user-controlled basepath / baseUrl in 8 chat-model nodesflowise, flowise-components
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- Highn8n-MCP: Multi-tenant MCP requests fall back to process-level n8n credentials when tenant headers are absent or incompleten8n-mcp
- Highn8n-mcp affected by path traversal, redirect-following SSRF, and telemetry payload exposuren8n-mcp
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- Highn8n-mcp's IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses bypass SSRF protection in validateUrlSync(), enabling full SSRF for SDK embeddersn8n-mcp
- Highn8n-mcp has unauthenticated session termination and information disclosure in HTTP transportn8n-mcp
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.