UTC
High

n8n-mcp has authenticated SSRF via instance-URL header in multi-tenant HTTP mode

CVE-2026-39974 · GHSA-4ggg-h7ph-26qr · published 2026-04-08 · updated 2026-04-09

Severity
High
CVSS score
8.5
Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
0.32%
Fixed in
2.47.4
  • Exploitation No known exploitation
  • Automatable No
  • Technical impact Partial
  • CISA SSVC
What it is

An authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in n8n-mcp allows a caller holding a valid AUTHTOKEN to cause the server to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs supplied through multi-tenant HTTP headers. Response bodies are reflected back through JSON-RPC, so an attacker can read the contents of any URL the server can reach — including cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), internal network services, and any other host the server process has network access to. The primary at-risk deployments are multi-tenant HTTP installations where more than one operator can present a valid AUTHTOKEN, or where a token is shared with less-trusted clients.

What to do

Upgrade n8n-mcp to 2.47.4 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.

n8n-mcp 2.47.4 and later.

If you cannot upgrade yet

If you cannot immediately upgrade: 1. Egress filtering at the network layer — block outbound traffic from the n8n-mcp container to RFC1918 ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16), link-local 169.254.0.0/16, and any other internal ranges. This defends against any future SSRF-class issue and is recommended even after upgrading. 2. Disable multi-tenant headers — if your deployment does not require per-request instance switching, unset ENABLEMULTITENANT and do not accept x-n8n-url / x-n8n-key headers at the reverse proxy. 3. Restrict AUTHTOKEN distribution** — ensure the bearer token is only held by fully trusted operators until you can upgrade.

Affected
PackageRegistryAffectedFixed in
n8n-mcpnpm<= 2.47.32.47.4

The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.

Sources: GitHub Advisory Database, reviewed and malware advisories (CC BY 4.0, https://github.com/advisories); advisories published by Cursor (https://github.com/cursor/cursor/security/advisories); advisories published by OpenClaw (https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories); advisories published by vLLM (https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories); advisories published by Open WebUI (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories); advisories published by n8n (https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories); advisories published by Flowise (https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories); advisories published by Langflow (https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories); advisories published by the MCP Python SDK project (https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/security/advisories); advisories published by MLflow (https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/security/advisories); CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (CC0). Data as of 2026-11-22. ShieldMap describes how each problem works and how to fix it; it does not publish exploit code. Report a correction to [email protected].