Todoist MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding lets websites write and delete Todoist data through local MCP server
CVE-2026-76807 · GHSA-833v-v58w-294h · published 2026-11-19
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS score
- 9.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.22%
- Fixed in
- 10.3.3
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
A public website can operate a victim's local todoist-mcp-http server when the optional HTTP transport is running. The browser does not supply a Todoist API token. The MCP server supplies its configured TODOIST_API_KEY. The demonstrated impact is Todoist task creation and completion. The same browser-origin path exposes the rest of the registered Todoist write surface, including task updates, task rescheduling, project and section changes, comments, reminders, filters, labels, goals, assignments, and object deletion. This violates the browser-origin boundary. …
Upgrade @doist/todoist-mcp to 10.3.3 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Add strict Host validation before MCP dispatch. For local deployments, accept only explicit loopback hostnames such as 127.0.0.1, localhost, [::1], and any operator-configured trusted names. Reject browser requests with missing or untrusted Origin values before they reach StreamableHTTPServerTransport. Require a per-run local bearer token or equivalent caller secret for HTTP MCP mode, including loopback deployments. Host and Origin validation reduce DNS-rebinding exposure, but they are not caller authentication. Enable DNS rebinding protection in the MCP SDK HTTP transport if available, and pass explicit allowed host and origin lists. Keep stdio as the safest default local transport.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| @doist/todoist-mcp | npm | <= 10.3.2 | 10.3.3 |
- CriticalMarimo: Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution via Terminal WebSocket Authentication BypassmarimoExploited
- CriticalLangflow CORS misconfiguration enables Account Takeover and RCElangflowExploited
- HighLiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough FallbacklitellmExploited
- HighLangflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's FlowlangflowExploited
- CriticalLangflow: Unauthenticated Flow Execution via Webhook Authentication Bypasslangflow
- Critical[mcp-atlassian] Authentication bypass in HTTP transport: AtlassianOpaqueTokenVerifier accepts any non-empty tokenmcp-atlassian
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.