n8n-mcp webhook and API client paths has an authenticated SSRF
CVE-2026-44694 · GHSA-cmrh-wvq6-wm9r · published 2026-05-08 · updated 2026-05-13
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.2
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.24%
- Fixed in
- 2.50.2
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
A caller with access to the MCP session can drive HTTP requests from the n8n-mcp host to internal services and cloud metadata endpoints that the SSRF gate is meant to block. The response body is returned to the caller, making internal-service enumeration and credential theft immediate without any out-of-band channel. Multi-tenant HTTP deployments where tenants share an AUTHTOKEN: any tenant with valid credentials can reach the operator's cloud metadata service and exfiltrate temporary IAM / GCP service account / Azure managed-identity credentials.
Upgrade n8n-mcp to 2.50.2 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Fixed in [email protected]. Note for operators: The same SSRF gate that previously covered webhook URLs now also covers the n8n API client base URL. If N8NAPIURL points at http://localhost:5678 (n8n on the same host) or an RFC1918 address (n8n on the same private network), set WEBHOOKSECURITYMODE=moderate (allows localhost, still blocks RFC1918 and cloud metadata) or WEBHOOKSECURITYMODE=permissive (allows RFC1918 too — only safe on a trusted private network). Default strict is correct for deployments where n8n is reachable at a public hostname.
For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately: 1. Restrict network egress from the n8n-mcp host with a firewall, reverse proxy, or cloud security group. Explicitly deny cloud metadata IPs (169.254.169.254, 169.254.170.2, 100.100.100.200, 192.0.0.192, and the GCP metadata.google.internal resolved IP) and any RFC1918 networks the server does not legitimately need to reach. 2. Run in stdio mode instead of HTTP if the multi-tenant surface is not needed (no shared AUTHTOKEN to compromise). 3. Disable workflow management tools** via if the deployment does not need them.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| n8n-mcp | npm | >= 2.18.7, < 2.50.2 | 2.50.2 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.