n8n-mcp's IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses bypass SSRF protection in validateUrlSync(), enabling full SSRF for SDK embedders
CVE-2026-42449 · GHSA-56c3-vfp2-5qqj · published 2026-04-30 · updated 2026-05-11
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.21%
- Fixed in
- 2.47.14
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
In the SDK embedder path (N8NDocumentationMCPServer constructor, getN8nApiClient(), and validateInstanceContext()), the synchronous URL validator in SSRFProtection.validateUrlSync() had no IPv6 checks. IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses such as http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254] bypassed the cloud-metadata, localhost, and private-IP range checks. An attacker able to supply an n8nApiUrl value could cause the server to issue HTTP requests to cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), RFC1918 private networks, or localhost services.
Upgrade n8n-mcp to 2.47.14 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
v2.47.14 and later. npm: npx n8n-mcp@latest (or pin to >= 2.47.14) Docker:
If developers cannot upgrade immediately: Validate URLs before passing to the SDK — reject any n8nApiUrl whose hostname is an IP literal (bracketed IPv6 or dotted IPv4) before calling N8NDocumentationMCPServer / getN8nApiClient(). Accept only URLs with DNS-resolvable hostnames. Restrict egress at the network layer — block outbound traffic from the n8n-mcp process to RFC1918 ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16), link-local 169.254.0.0/16, and cloud metadata endpoints. Defense-in-depth against this class of issue and recommended even after upgrading.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| n8n-mcp | npm | >= 2.47.4, < 2.47.14 | 2.47.14 |
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- Critical@zereight/mcp-gitlab Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery@zereight/mcp-gitlab
- CriticalSSRF + LLM API key exfiltration via user-controlled basepath / baseUrl in 8 chat-model nodesflowise, flowise-components
- CriticalLocalAI POST /models/apply permits unauthenticated server-side request forgery through gallery URLsgithub.com/mudler/LocalAI
- CriticalFastMCP OpenAPI Provider has an SSRF & Path Traversal Vulnerabilityfastmcp
- CriticalBentoML SSRF Vulnerability in File Upload Processingbentoml
- Criticaln8n-MCP: Cross-tenant access to workflow version backups in multi-tenant HTTP deploymentsn8n-mcp
- Highn8n-MCP: Multi-tenant MCP requests fall back to process-level n8n credentials when tenant headers are absent or incompleten8n-mcp
- Highn8n-mcp affected by path traversal, redirect-following SSRF, and telemetry payload exposuren8n-mcp
- Highn8n-mcp webhook and API client paths has an authenticated SSRFn8n-mcp
- Highn8n-mcp has unauthenticated session termination and information disclosure in HTTP transportn8n-mcp
- Highn8n-mcp has authenticated SSRF via instance-URL header in multi-tenant HTTP moden8n-mcp
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.