BullMQ dashboard `/admin/queues` is auth-only (no RBAC), exposing cross-tenant job payloads to every authenticated user
GHSA-rpcc-gw54-mfgx · published 2026-09-10
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.7
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- No fix yet
Class: Authorization bypass / Insecure Direct Object Reference at the route level (CWE-862, CWE-269). Affected: Flowise deployments running in queue mode with the BullMQ dashboard enabled and not running on Flowise Cloud: . Prerequisites: any session cookie (any role). Result: Cross-tenant read of prediction and upsertion job payloads Cross-tenant write via Bull-Board's UI: retry/remove/promote/ Workspace member authoring chatflow A can read another
No fixed release is listed yet for flowise. Follow the source advisory for updates, and until one ships:
Set ENABLE_BULLMQ_DASHBOARD to anything other than true (or unset it). The dashboard then will not be mounted at all and Flowise in queue mode continues to function — only the inspection UI is disabled. If the dashboard is required for operational use, restrict access at the network layer (e.g., a reverse proxy that gates /admin/queues/* on a VPN allow-list or a separate IdP-signed cookie) until the upstream RBAC check ships. …
Maintainer fix (one-line — extend existing RBAC): add a permission check to the mount. In packages/server/src/index.ts:334: This requires registering a new permission admin:queues in — assign it to the OWNER role only. Org admins keep dashboard access; everyone else gets 403. Either fix closes the same-instance cross-tenant exposure.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| flowise | npm | <= 3.1.4 | No fix yet |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by Flowise). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.