INVITED users auto-promoted via SSO email match (invite-token bypass)
GHSA-vf3j-89vf-r697 · published 2026-09-10
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS score
- 9.2
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- No fix yet
Class: Improper Authentication (CWE-287) primary; Authentication Bypass via Alternate Path (CWE-288); Use of Single-Factor Authentication based on Incorrect Identifier (CWE-308 in spirit); Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (CWE-639). The invite-token-bypass aspect specifically maps to CWE-302 (Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data) — the server is treating its own DB-stored tempToken as if it had been supplied by an authenticated caller. Affected: Flowise Enterprise platform deployments — i.e., all paid-tier customers using SSO and the user-invitation flow. Both are baseline Enterprise features, so practically every deployment is in scope. …
No fixed release is listed yet for flowise. Follow the source advisory for updates, and until one ships:
Use only ONE SSO provider per Flowise Enterprise instance, with strict email verification. Disable Auth0 entirely if its configured connection allows verify_email_on_signup: false. Disable the invite-by-email flow entirely and onboard users manually via direct SSO provisioning (e.g., create the user in Azure AD / Google Workspace, then have them sign in to Flowise via SSO; let CLOUD-mode auto-registration handle the User row creation). This route avoids the INVITED status entirely. …
General guidance from ShieldPi, not a vendor fix
- Missing or bypassable authentication. Do not expose it on a network others can reach, and put authentication you control in front of it, such as an authenticating proxy or a VPN. Binding it to localhost is not enough on its own: a web page open in your browser can still reach it, so require a token as well.
Maintainer fix (recommended — do not auto-promote in the SSO path): The simplest correct change is to not bypass the email-link flow. Treat INVITED users as "still requiring the email link" even when an SSO callback arrives with their email. Practically: in SSOBase.ts:80-94, replace the auto-promote branch with a refusal: This forces the legitimate invitee to click the email link (proving email ownership), set up their account, and only then sign in via SSO. The attacker — who cannot read the email — has no path to ACTIVE. …
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| flowise | npm | <= 3.1.4 | No fix yet |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by Flowise). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.