UTC
Critical

Cross-IdP account takeover via email-only SSO matching

GHSA-cffm-583c-vffr · published 2026-09-10

Severity
Critical
CVSS score
9.2
Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
No CVE
Fixed in
No fix yet
What it is

Class: Improper Authentication (CWE-287) primary; Authentication Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (CWE-639); Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity (CWE-345); Use of Single-Factor Authentication based on incorrect identifier (CWE-308 in spirit). Affected: Flowise Enterprise platform deployments — i.e., all paid-tier customers using SSO, which is the explicit target market for the Enterprise SKU. Cloud platform deployments are also affected: in CLOUD mode, the email-only matcher will additionally auto-create a fresh Flowise account for any provider-claimed email — so the same fundamental defect leads to spoofable registrations as well. …

What to do

No fixed release is listed yet for flowise. Follow the source advisory for updates, and until one ships:

From the advisory, shortened (published by Flowise)
Use only ONE SSO provider per Flowise Enterprise instance, and pick a provider that strictly verifies emails (Google Workspace, Microsoft Entra, GitHub for organizations with verified domains). Disable Auth0 if its connection allows verify_email_on_signup: false. Disable local-password authentication if any SSO provider is configured. Remove existing local-password hashes by null-ing the credential column on User rows. …

The full advisory →

General guidance from ShieldPi, not a vendor fix

  • Missing or bypassable authentication. Do not expose it on a network others can reach, and put authentication you control in front of it, such as an authenticating proxy or a VPN. Binding it to localhost is not enough on its own: a web page open in your browser can still reach it, so require a token as well.

Introduce a UserIdentity (or similar) entity that maps each (provider, sub) to a single Flowise User. Make this binding the sole basis for SSO authentication; never auto-merge by email. 1. Schema migration. 2. 3. Account-linking flow. Add an authenticated endpoint POST /api/v1/account/link-provider/ that the user accesses while logged in via their existing channel. It initiates an OIDC flow and, on callback, persists a new UserIdentity row for (provider, sub, userId=req.user.id). The user can revoke bindings from account settings. 4. Migration of existing accounts. …

Affected
PackageRegistryAffectedFixed in
flowisenpm<= 3.1.4No fix yet

The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by Flowise). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.

Sources: GitHub Advisory Database, reviewed and malware advisories (CC BY 4.0, https://github.com/advisories); advisories published by Cursor (https://github.com/cursor/cursor/security/advisories); advisories published by OpenClaw (https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories); advisories published by vLLM (https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories); advisories published by Open WebUI (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories); advisories published by n8n (https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories); advisories published by Flowise (https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories); advisories published by Langflow (https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories); advisories published by the MCP Python SDK project (https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/security/advisories); advisories published by MLflow (https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/security/advisories); CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (CC0). Data as of 2026-11-22. ShieldMap describes how each problem works and how to fix it; it does not publish exploit code. Report a correction to [email protected].