Cross-IdP account takeover via email-only SSO matching
GHSA-cffm-583c-vffr · published 2026-09-10
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS score
- 9.2
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- No fix yet
Class: Improper Authentication (CWE-287) primary; Authentication Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (CWE-639); Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity (CWE-345); Use of Single-Factor Authentication based on incorrect identifier (CWE-308 in spirit). Affected: Flowise Enterprise platform deployments — i.e., all paid-tier customers using SSO, which is the explicit target market for the Enterprise SKU. Cloud platform deployments are also affected: in CLOUD mode, the email-only matcher will additionally auto-create a fresh Flowise account for any provider-claimed email — so the same fundamental defect leads to spoofable registrations as well. …
No fixed release is listed yet for flowise. Follow the source advisory for updates, and until one ships:
Use only ONE SSO provider per Flowise Enterprise instance, and pick a provider that strictly verifies emails (Google Workspace, Microsoft Entra, GitHub for organizations with verified domains). Disable Auth0 if its connection allows verify_email_on_signup: false. Disable local-password authentication if any SSO provider is configured. Remove existing local-password hashes by null-ing the credential column on User rows. …
General guidance from ShieldPi, not a vendor fix
- Missing or bypassable authentication. Do not expose it on a network others can reach, and put authentication you control in front of it, such as an authenticating proxy or a VPN. Binding it to localhost is not enough on its own: a web page open in your browser can still reach it, so require a token as well.
Introduce a UserIdentity (or similar) entity that maps each (provider, sub) to a single Flowise User. Make this binding the sole basis for SSO authentication; never auto-merge by email. 1. Schema migration. 2. 3. Account-linking flow. Add an authenticated endpoint POST /api/v1/account/link-provider/ that the user accesses while logged in via their existing channel. It initiates an OIDC flow and, on callback, persists a new UserIdentity row for (provider, sub, userId=req.user.id). The user can revoke bindings from account settings. 4. Migration of existing accounts. …
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| flowise | npm | <= 3.1.4 | No fix yet |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by Flowise). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.