Langflow : Cross-user flow access and vertex execution via deprecated /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/vertices endpoints
CVE-2026-105698 · GHSA-gh98-4phw-6fmw · published 2026-10-07
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.4
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.22%
- Fixed in
- 1.10.1
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
Confidentiality (Low): Discloses the structure of private flows (vertex IDs and component types) and the outputs of vertices the attacker chooses to build. That includes values hardcoded in node configuration, such as prompt text or fixed inputs. Global variables and credentials in the variable store are not exposed, because variable resolution uses the caller's userid. The victim's stored flow definition is not returned wholesale. Integrity (Low): The attacker can trigger execution of the victim's nodes, including any side effects baked into their configuration (fixed endpoints, webhooks, hardcoded API keys). Build records are written under the victim's flowid.
Upgrade langflow to 1.10.1 or later, and langflow-base to 0.10.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Fixed in Langflow 1.10.1 (langflow-base 0.10.1) by #13153 (merge commit fb3d6ec90b). Both handlers now: 1. inject currentuser (for retrievevertices_order, this replaces the dependencies-only declaration), 2. load the flow with an owner-scoped query and return 404 when it is not found, so a flow you don't own looks the same as a missing flow, and 3. call before building or caching any graph.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, block POST /api/v1/build//vertices and POST /api/v1/build//vertices/ (and GET /api/v1/build//*/stream) at a reverse proxy. The Langflow UI does not use these routes.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| langflow | PyPI | >= 1.0.0, < 1.10.1 | 1.10.1 |
| langflow-base | PyPI | < 0.10.1 | 0.10.1 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.