[mcp-atlassian] Authentication bypass in HTTP transport: AtlassianOpaqueTokenVerifier accepts any non-empty token
CVE-2026-77244 · GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6 · published 2026-09-22
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS score
- 10.0
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.35%
- Fixed in
- 0.22.0
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
Attacker profile: any party with network reach to the HTTP transport. No credentials, no prior account, no privileged position required. Typical deployment patterns at risk: Docker compose with port exposed (very common in mcp-atlassian's Cloud-deployed MCP server behind a load balancer where the LB Internal corporate network where any employee can reach the server Misconfigured Kubernetes ingress Tunneled MCP server via ngrok / Cloudflare Tunnel for development Security impact after exploitation: 1. Full Jira read access. Every project, every issue, every comment, every attachment, every user — using the operator's API token. 2. Full Jira write access. Create, edit, delete issues. …
Upgrade mcp-atlassian to 0.22.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The most direct fix is the standard MCP-server-with-env-creds pattern: 1. When OAUTH_PROXY_ENABLE_ENV is not set, REFUSE to start the HTTP 2. Even with SINGLE_USER_MODE, bind the HTTP transport to 127.0.0.1 3. Document the multi-tenant pattern as requiring OAuth proxy or 4. Replace AtlassianOpaqueTokenVerifier with a verifier that performs Defense in depth: the README quickstart should not encourage exposing the HTTP transport without auth. The docker-compose.yml in the repo should bind to 127.0.0.1 only by default.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| mcp-atlassian | PyPI | < 0.22.0 | 0.22.0 |
- CriticalMarimo: Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution via Terminal WebSocket Authentication BypassmarimoExploited
- CriticalLangflow CORS misconfiguration enables Account Takeover and RCElangflowExploited
- HighLiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough FallbacklitellmExploited
- HighLangflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's FlowlangflowExploited
- CriticalTodoist MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding lets websites write and delete Todoist data through local MCP server@doist/todoist-mcp
- CriticalLangflow: Unauthenticated Flow Execution via Webhook Authentication Bypasslangflow
- CriticalMCP Atlassian has an arbitrary file write leading to arbitrary code execution via unconstrained download_path in confluence_download_attachmmcp-atlassian
- HighMCP Atlassian: Arbitrary File Read & Exfiltration (Confused Deputy) in JIRA update_issuemcp-atlassian
- HighMCP Atlassian: ENABLED_TOOLS / Toolset authorization bypassmcp-atlassian
- Highmcp-atlassian has an incomplete SSRF remediationmcp-atlassian
- HighMCP Atlassian: SSRF redirect protection missing for basic-auth and OAuth authentication branchesmcp-atlassian
- HighMCP Atlassian: Arbitrary file read via confluence_upload_attachment allows exfiltration of server credentialsmcp-atlassian
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.