vLLM: Qwen2-VL / Qwen3-VL video samplers bound on request-controlled max_frames, which the num_frames ceiling does not reach
CVE-2026-105758 · GHSA-x6mc-67gf-chw4 · published 2026-10-05
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.30%
- Fixed in
- 0.30.0
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
Unauthenticated remote denial of service by memory exhaustion of the API-server process. The decode runs in the frontend during chat parsing, before scheduling or admission control, so every tenant on the instance is affected. --limit-mm-per-prompt does not apply — it bounds media items, not frames within an item. CWE-770 / CWE-400. Measured over unauthenticated HTTP: 1.43 MiB request body, 74 extra bytes of JSON, server peak RSS 2 271 → 13 629 MiB. In-process, the same request takes the decode from 60 to 900 frames. The frame count is bounded only by totalframesnum, which is the attacker's choice of video, and decoded bytes are frames × H × W × 3.
Upgrade vllm to 0.30.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
This is not a new control being proposed. Commit 8b6de0eb9 — "[Security] Cap GLMGA video sampling to prevent request-driven resource exhaustion" (PR #54935, merged 2026-09-04, same author as #51969) — caps precisely these two knobs for GLMGAVideoBackend: Its description states the root cause as "both targetfps and maxframes are controllable via request-level mediaiokwargs", and says it follows "the pattern established by GLM46VVideoBackend" (which caps via MAXFRAMECOUNTDYNAMIC = 640 and MAXDURATION = 2400). So two backends cap request-controlled fps/maxframes as an accepted security measure.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| vllm | PyPI | >= 0.24.0, < 0.30.0 | 0.30.0 |
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- HighMCP TypeScript SDK: HTTP server transports and handlers did not limit request body size or JSON-RPC batch length@modelcontextprotocol/hono, @modelcontextprotocol/node, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, @modelcontextprotocol/server
- HighMCP TypeScript SDK: One HTTP request within the default size limit could exhaust server memory during validation@modelcontextprotocol/sdk, @modelcontextprotocol/server
- HighHTTP server transports and OAuth endpoints read request bodies with no size limitmcp, mcp
- HighLMDeploy vulnerable to arbitrary code execution via eval() of untrusted quant_dtype in model config loadinglmdeploy
- HighRMCP: Unauthenticated permanent session-table leak in rmcp Streamable HTTP server transport leads to remote denial-of-servicermcp
- CriticalvLLM: OpenAI auth bypassvllm
- CriticalvLLM has RCE In Video Processingvllm
- CriticalvLLM Allows Remote Code Execution via PyNcclPipe Communication Servicevllm
- CriticalvLLM Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Mooncake Integrationvllm
- CriticalCVE-2025-24357 Malicious model remote code execution fix bypass with PyTorch < 2.6.0vllm
- CriticalvLLM Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerabilityvllm
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.