HTTP server transports and OAuth endpoints read request bodies with no size limit
CVE-2026-109527 · GHSA-fmmv-w9g8-j3gc · published 2026-09-30 · updated 2026-10-14
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- Not scored
- Fixed in
- 2.1.0
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
In affected versions, an MCP server built with this SDK read the whole body of every HTTP request into memory before checking its size. One large request grew the process's memory by two to three times the size of the body, so a client that could reach the server over HTTP could exhaust its memory and take it offline, repeatedly. No credentials are needed against the OAuth endpoints, or against a server that does not require authentication (the default).
Upgrade mcp to 2.1.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Upgrade to mcp 1.29.1 (1.x) or 2.1.0 (2.x) or later. There is no fixed 2.0.x release. Every HTTP endpoint the SDK provides then reads the body through one shared limit (default 4 MiB) and answers 413 as soon as a request declares or streams more than that, before any parsing. If your clients send single messages larger than 4 MiB, raise the limit with max_request_body_size=: 1.x: FastMCP(..., max_request_body_size=...) 2.x: MCPServer.run(), streamable_http_app(), sse_app() or StreamableHTTPSessionManager / SseServerTransport when you construct them yourself Code that drives StreamableHTTPServerTransport directly, without the session manager, does not get the limit and should bound request b…
37 registered MCP servers install an affected version today, by the dependency versions a fresh install resolves.
- com.cyberspf/mcpmcp@1.9.4
- com.lucidlink/mcpmcp@2.0.0
- com.nautaai/holster-mcpmcp@1.27.2
- io.github.abhichandra21/promptheusmcp@1.12.4
- io.github.AdonaiVera/fiftyone-mcp-servermcp@0.9.1
- io.github.Alejandrehl/kainext-binance-mcpmcp@1.29.0
- io.github.amin-ale/mcp-quickbooksmcp@1.28.1
- io.github.AndreySukhanov/summarix-telegrammcp@1.12.4
- io.github.ashlesh-t/cognirepomcp@1.27.0
- io.github.astrogilda/waitbusmcp@1.28.1
- io.github.cr7258/elasticsearch-mcp-servermcp@1.9.2
- io.github.DDYRich72/uptocodemcp@1.28.1
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- HighvLLM : DoS via unvalidated mm_processor_kwargs in multimodal image processors (Isaac, InternVL, H2OVL, etc.)vllm
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- HighModel Context Protocol Python SDK: OAuth client could send credentials to an authorization server chosen by the MCP servermcp, mcp
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- HighMCP Python SDK: HTTP transports serve session requests without verifying the authenticated principalmcp
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- HighMCP Python SDK vulnerability in the FastMCP Server causes validation error, leading to DoSmcp
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by the MCP Python SDK project). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.