RMCP: Unauthenticated permanent session-table leak in rmcp Streamable HTTP server transport leads to remote denial-of-service
CVE-2026-63128 · GHSA-9pj6-vhgr-3mwh · published 2026-09-16
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.53%
- Fixed in
- 2.0.0
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
Attack vector: Network (AV:N). The listener binds a TCP port; the default accepts anything reaching it over the loopback interface. In the dominant deployment model — a Streamable HTTP MCP server embedded into an IDE or local agent — any co-resident process on the host is a candidate attacker. In LAN deployments where the operator widened allowedhosts to a public hostname, the attack is reachable from the network. Authentication required: None. User interaction required: None. Result: Denial of Service. Memory grows linearly with attacker request volume (~400–550 bytes per leaked entry, including the SessionId Arc , the LocalSessionHandle struct, and the half-dropped mpsc channel Inner).
Upgrade rmcp to 2.0.0 or later.
Two minimally invasive options. Both have been considered against the existing API; the maintainers will know which fits better with the internal contracts. 1. Validate before allocating. Move the line. Reject non-initialize bodies with 422 before any state is created. This removes a class of bugs rather than patching one path. The downside is that validateheadermatchesinitbody currently reads initreq.params.protocolversion, so the InitializeRequest discriminant has to be deconstructed earlier — a small refactor. 2. RAII guard for the session. Wrap the sessionid returned by createsession in a guard whose Drop impl spawns a close_session call.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| rmcp | crates.io | < 2.0.0 | 2.0.0 |
- HightsParticles: Unbounded HTTP Request Body Buffering in @tsparticles/mcp-server Leads to Remote DoS@tsparticles/mcp-server
- HighMissing request-wide media budget allows single-request frontend resource exhaustionvllm
- HighMCP TypeScript SDK: HTTP server transports and handlers did not limit request body size or JSON-RPC batch length@modelcontextprotocol/hono, @modelcontextprotocol/node, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, @modelcontextprotocol/server
- HighvLLM : DoS via unvalidated mm_processor_kwargs in multimodal image processors (Isaac, InternVL, H2OVL, etc.)vllm
- HighMCP TypeScript SDK: One HTTP request within the default size limit could exhaust server memory during validation@modelcontextprotocol/sdk, @modelcontextprotocol/server
- HighFrame-count cap bypass in VideoMediaIO.load_base64 for video/jpeg via media_io_kwargs.video.num_framesvllm
- HighRMCP: Missing Resource Field Validation in OAuth Protected Resource Metadata Discoveryrmcp
- Highrmcp Streamable HTTP server transport has a DNS rebinding vulnerabilityrmcp
- Mediumrmcp OAuth client fetches server-controlled resource_metadata URLsrmcp
- MediumRMCP: Custom HTTP headers leak to cross-origin redirect targetsrmcp
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.