MCP Atlassian: JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER / CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER allow forbidden-project content exfiltration (one LIVE-proven on Atlassian Cl
CVE-2026-77251 · GHSA-w66g-j6c4-hcfc · published 2026-09-22
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.27%
- Fixed in
- 0.22.0
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
Severity is higher in deployments where the operator's PAT covers a broader set of projects than JIRAPROJECTSFILTER (= the common configuration, which is the reason operators set the filter). Affected: every operator who relies on JIRAPROJECTSFILTER / CONFLUENCESPACESFILTER to confine an attacker-controlled MCP client (= prompt-injected LLM agent) to a subset of their workspace.
Upgrade mcp-atlassian to 0.22.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
1. Replace substring checks with AST-based JQL/CQL parsers that walk the WHERE clause looking for project/space constraints. Reject queries whose project/space constraint references a key not in the allowlist. 2. Add projectsfilter check inside getboardissues (resolve board → project, reject if not in filter) and getagile_boards (filter returned list). 3. Make the Confluence substring check case-insensitive (cql.lower()) for defense-in-depth, even after the AST fix lands. 4. Default-deny for ambiguous queries: if the AST parser can't fully classify a clause, refuse instead of pass-through. 5. Add unit tests that assert attacker JQL project = returns zero results when the filter is set.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| mcp-atlassian | PyPI | < 0.22.0 | 0.22.0 |
- CriticalMarimo: Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution via Terminal WebSocket Authentication BypassmarimoExploited
- CriticalLangflow CORS misconfiguration enables Account Takeover and RCElangflowExploited
- HighLiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough FallbacklitellmExploited
- HighLangflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's FlowlangflowExploited
- CriticalTodoist MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding lets websites write and delete Todoist data through local MCP server@doist/todoist-mcp
- CriticalLangflow: Unauthenticated Flow Execution via Webhook Authentication Bypasslangflow
- Critical[mcp-atlassian] Authentication bypass in HTTP transport: AtlassianOpaqueTokenVerifier accepts any non-empty tokenmcp-atlassian
- CriticalMCP Atlassian has an arbitrary file write leading to arbitrary code execution via unconstrained download_path in confluence_download_attachmmcp-atlassian
- HighMCP Atlassian: Arbitrary File Read & Exfiltration (Confused Deputy) in JIRA update_issuemcp-atlassian
- HighMCP Atlassian: ENABLED_TOOLS / Toolset authorization bypassmcp-atlassian
- Highmcp-atlassian has an incomplete SSRF remediationmcp-atlassian
- HighMCP Atlassian: SSRF redirect protection missing for basic-auth and OAuth authentication branchesmcp-atlassian
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.