Rust gRPC Generate accepts out-of-vocabulary prompt token IDs and can terminate EngineCore
GHSA-w2v2-5662-8v5q · published 2026-10-09 · updated 2026-10-27
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.9
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 0.24.0
An attacker who can reach a vLLM Rust gRPC endpoint can submit a Generate or GenerateStream request with an out-of-vocabulary prompt.token_ids value. The request is accepted by the gRPC frontend and submitted to the shared text generation path. The same invalid token-id sink is documented publicly in PR #45441 as aborting EngineCore for the Rust HTTP sibling route. Expected impact is a single-request denial of service for deployments exposing the Rust gRPC service. Fixed behavior should be an INVALID_ARGUMENT gRPC status before the request is submitted to the engine. …
Upgrade vllm to 0.24.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Apply the same token-id range validation used by the Rust OpenAI and HTTP generate routes before either gRPC handler calls state.chat.text().generate(). The gRPC fix should validate: GenerateRequest.prompt.token_ids against the same prompt bound used by PR #45441, namely the union of tokenizer and model vocabulary bounds. DecodingParameters.allowed_token_ids against tokenizer vocabulary. DecodingParameters.logit_bias keys against model vocabulary. and , if they are lowered into logprob_token_ids, against the same model/tokenizer bounds used by the corresponding HTTP route. …
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| vllm | PyPI | >= 0.22.0, < 0.24.0 | 0.24.0 |
- HightsParticles: Unbounded HTTP Request Body Buffering in @tsparticles/mcp-server Leads to Remote DoS@tsparticles/mcp-server
- HighMCP TypeScript SDK: HTTP server transports and handlers did not limit request body size or JSON-RPC batch length@modelcontextprotocol/hono, @modelcontextprotocol/node, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, @modelcontextprotocol/server
- HighMCP TypeScript SDK: One HTTP request within the default size limit could exhaust server memory during validation@modelcontextprotocol/sdk, @modelcontextprotocol/server
- HighHTTP server transports and OAuth endpoints read request bodies with no size limitmcp, mcp
- HighLMDeploy vulnerable to arbitrary code execution via eval() of untrusted quant_dtype in model config loadinglmdeploy
- HighRMCP: Unauthenticated permanent session-table leak in rmcp Streamable HTTP server transport leads to remote denial-of-servicermcp
- CriticalvLLM: OpenAI auth bypassvllm
- CriticalvLLM has RCE In Video Processingvllm
- CriticalvLLM Allows Remote Code Execution via PyNcclPipe Communication Servicevllm
- CriticalvLLM Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Mooncake Integrationvllm
- CriticalCVE-2025-24357 Malicious model remote code execution fix bypass with PyTorch < 2.6.0vllm
- CriticalvLLM Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerabilityvllm
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by vLLM). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.