Rust HTTP/gRPC stop_token_ids bypass Python vocab-bound fix and can terminate EngineCore
GHSA-qff2-492f-9fm4 · published 2026-09-12 · updated 2026-10-27
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.9
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 0.24.0
An attacker who can reach an affected Rust HTTP or Rust gRPC vLLM endpoint can send a small generation request with min_tokens = 1 and a stop_token_ids entry greater than or equal to the served model vocabulary size. Expected impact is single-request denial of service for affected deployments: the Rust frontend accepts and lowers the request, and the shared Python EngineCore min-tokens processor can use the out-of-range token ID as a GPU logits tensor index. Public PR #44968 states that this condition puts EngineCore into a fatal state and requires full service restart. This report does not claim code execution, data access, model compromise, or persistence. …
Upgrade vllm to 0.24.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Apply the same vocab-bound validation model to Rust HTTP and Rust gRPC before request lowering: add a Rust helper equivalent to Python _validate_stop_token_ids(); validate every stop_token_ids entry against the served vocabulary boundary when stop_token_ids is present; apply it in both Rust OpenAI completions and chat completions validators; apply equivalent validation for gRPC StoppingCriteria.stop_token_ids before building SamplingParams; reject with ApiError or Status::invalid_argument(...) before submitting an engine request; add regression tests for valid in-vocab IDs and invalid out-of-vocab IDs on: Rust HTTP /v1/completions; Rust HTTP /v1/chat/completions; Rust gRPC Generate; Rust gR…
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| vllm | PyPI | >= 0.22.0, < 0.24.0 | 0.24.0 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by vLLM). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.