Remote media is fetched and fully materialized before the documented media size / item limits are enforced — remote pre-inference memory and
GHSA-p6g9-7v3x-m8mv · published 2026-09-12
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- No fix yet
A single client that can reach an affected media ingress path can force the shared serving process (or batch runner) to allocate memory and consume outbound bandwidth proportional to an attacker-chosen compressed body size (Sites 1, 2, 3) or media item count (Site 4) before the request is rejected. Repeated or concurrent requests compound the pressure, up to out-of-memory of a single process. The documented VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB / --limit-mm-per-prompt controls give operators a false sense of protection on these surfaces because they run too late or not at all. …
No fixed release is listed yet for vllm. Limit what it can reach, or stop using it until a fix ships, and follow the source advisory for updates.
Enforce a shared compressed-byte / item-count budget at the acquisition boundary before vLLM creates a full attacker-sized bytes object or spawns per-part fetch work, then keep the existing decode-stage limits as second-stage guards. Add a max_bytes parameter to HTTPConnection.get_bytes / async_get_bytes: honor Content-Length when present, stream in bounded (e.g. 64 KiB) chunks, and abort once the cumulative total exceeds the budget. Only cache or hand off to a decoder after the budget check passes. For inline data: / input_audio payloads, reject from the encoded length ( ) before b64decode, with a post-decode length backstop. …
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| vllm | PyPI | <= 0.29.0 | No fix yet |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by vLLM). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.