LiteLLM: Authentication bypass via OIDC userinfo cache key collision
CVE-2026-35030 · GHSA-jjhc-v7c2-5hh6 · published 2026-04-03 · updated 2026-11-16
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS score
- 9.4
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.64%
- Fixed in
- 1.83.0
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
When JWT authentication is enabled (enablejwtauth: true), the OIDC userinfo cache uses token[:20] as the cache key. JWT headers produced by the same signing algorithm generate identical first 20 characters. This configuration option is not enabled by default. Most instances are not affected. An unauthenticated attacker can craft a token whose first 20 characters match a legitimate user's cached token. On cache hit, the attacker inherits the legitimate user's identity and permissions. This affects deployments with JWT/OIDC authentication enabled.
Upgrade litellm to 1.83.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Fixed in v1.83.0. The cache key now uses the full hash of the JWT token.
Disable OIDC userinfo caching by setting the cache TTL to 0, or disable JWT authentication entirely.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| litellm | PyPI | < 1.83.0 | 1.83.0 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.