PraisonAI: Coarse-Grained Tool Approval Cache Bypasses Per-Invocation Consent for Shell Commands
CVE-2026-56074 · GHSA-ffp3-3562-8cv3 · published 2026-04-10 · updated 2026-06-19
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.18%
- Fixed in
- 4.5.128
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
Secret exfiltration: An LLM agent (or one subjected to prompt injection) can dump all process environment variables after a single benign command approval. Common secrets include OPENAIAPIKEY, AWSSECRETACCESSKEY, DATABASEURL, and any other credentials passed via environment. Misleading consent UI: The console prompt displays specific arguments and uses language ("this tool") that implies per-invocation consent, but the system grants session-wide blanket approval. No expiration or scope: The approval cache uses a ContextVar that persists for the entire agent execution context with no timeout, no command-count limit, and no clearing between tool calls.
Upgrade praisonaiagents to 4.5.128 or later.
1. Per-invocation approval for critical tools — store a hash of (toolname, arguments) instead of just toolname, or require re-approval for each invocation of critical-risk tools:
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| praisonaiagents | PyPI | < 4.5.128 | 4.5.128 |
- CriticalMarimo: Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution via Terminal WebSocket Authentication BypassmarimoExploited
- CriticalLangflow CORS misconfiguration enables Account Takeover and RCElangflowExploited
- HighLiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough FallbacklitellmExploited
- HighLangflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's FlowlangflowExploited
- CriticalTodoist MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding lets websites write and delete Todoist data through local MCP server@doist/todoist-mcp
- CriticalLangflow: Unauthenticated Flow Execution via Webhook Authentication Bypasslangflow
- CriticalPraisonAI: CodeAgent Executes LLM-Generated Code Without Sandboxing and Leaks All Environment Secretspraisonaiagents
- CriticalPraisonAI: Unauthenticated RCE via Jobs API + Approval Bypasspraisonaiagents, praisonai
- CriticalPraisonAI: MCP SSE transport binds 0.0.0.0 with no authentication and no Origin validation; bundled SecurityConfig is never wired inpraisonaiagents
- CriticalPraisonAI AgentTeam.launch exposes unauthenticated remote agent listing and invocation endpointspraisonaiagents
- CriticalPraisonAI vulnerable to sandbox escape via `print.__self__` builtins module leak in `execute_code` (subprocess mode)praisonaiagents, praisonai
- CriticalPraisonAI Browser Server allows unauthenticated WebSocket clients to hijack connected extension sessionspraisonaiagents, praisonai
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.