PraisonAI AgentTeam.launch exposes unauthenticated remote agent listing and invocation endpoints
CVE-2026-57118 · GHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xp · published 2026-06-18 · updated 2026-07-20
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS score
- 9.8
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.41%
- Fixed in
- 1.6.59
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
If an operator follows the documented remote-server pattern and exposes an AgentTeam.launch() server on a reachable interface, any network client can invoke the deployed agents without credentials. Depending on the deployed agents, an unauthenticated caller may be able to: enumerate available agent IDs and names through GET /{path}/list; trigger model/API spend by repeatedly invoking agents; drive agents connected to local tools, internal APIs, SaaS integrations, browsers, files, or workflow actions; trigger side effects through per-agent endpoints even if the operator expected only the team endpoint to be used; access responses generated from connected private context, memory, or knowledge…
Upgrade praisonaiagents to 1.6.59 or later.
Recommended approach: 1. Add a shared authentication helper for all network-facing agent invocation servers. 2. Make AgentTeam.launch() fail closed for non-loopback binds unless a token/API key is configured. 3. Require Authorization: Bearer or an explicit documented API-key header for POST /{path}, GET /{path}/list, and POST /{path}/{agent_id}. 4. Default AgentTeam.launch() to host="127.0.0.1" unless an explicit unsafe/remote option plus auth is configured. 5.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| praisonaiagents | PyPI | < 1.6.59 | 1.6.59 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.