vLLM: Request-selected PyNvVideoCodec GPU decode bypasses static VRAM reservation
CVE-2026-69147 · GHSA-8pw2-6jv3-mj5j · published 2026-09-17
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.58%
- Fixed in
- 0.28.0
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
An attacker who can submit video requests to a vLLM deployment with PyNvVideoCodec available can force frontend GPU decoding even when the engine did not reserve memory for that decoder during startup. On high-utilization serving deployments, the unreserved CUDA context, retained decoder surfaces, and decoded-frame allocations can reduce or exhaust GPU memory that the engine assumed was available for weights, activations, or KV cache, causing request failures, worker crashes, or service-level denial of service. Suggested severity is Medium with conservative CVSS v3.1 (6.5). If a deployment exposes the affected API without authentication, PR:N would raise the deployment-specific score.
Upgrade vllm to 0.28.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Do not allow untrusted request fields to select a GPU decoder that was not included in startup memory reservation. The simplest fix is to reject request-level unless the static server configuration already selected PyNvVideoCodec and reserved its decoder/CUDA-context budget. If dynamic backend selection remains supported, split software and GPU decoder policies: allow request selection among CPU/software decoders only, require an explicit operator allowlist for GPU decoders, and include every request-selectable GPU decoder in the startup reservation predicate.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| vllm | PyPI | < 0.28.0 | 0.28.0 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.