Rust gRPC output_candidates.token_ids bypasses logprob_token_ids limits and can terminate EngineCore
GHSA-6pgw-f3pv-4h8q · published 2026-10-09 · updated 2026-10-27
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.9
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 0.24.0
An attacker who can reach a vLLM Rust gRPC endpoint can submit a generation request with output_logprobs = true and output_candidates.token_ids containing more than 128 IDs. Expected impact is a single-request denial of service for affected deployments: the request is accepted by the Rust gRPC frontend, reaches the engine logprob sampler state, and can terminate EngineCore. Fixed behavior should be an immediate INVALID_ARGUMENT response before any engine request is submitted. This report does not claim code execution, data access, model compromise, persistence, or public internet exposure. It is an availability issue caused by missing Rust gRPC input validation. …
Upgrade vllm to 0.24.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Validate before assigning params.logprob_token_ids. Recommended patch shape: define or import a Rust-side equivalent of MAX_LOGPROB_TOKEN_IDS = 128; reject output_candidates.token_ids when ids.len() > MAX_LOGPROB_TOKEN_IDS; range-check each supplied token ID against the served model vocabulary; keep params.logprobs consistent with the explicit ID count, or reject inconsistent combinations instead of lowering them; return Status::invalid_argument(...) from the gRPC converter before any engine request is submitted; and add unary Generate and streaming GenerateStream regression tests for 128 accepted IDs, 129 rejected IDs, and out-of-vocabulary candidate IDs. …
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| vllm | PyPI | >= 0.22.0, < 0.24.0 | 0.24.0 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by vLLM). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.