Jupyter MCP Server: Unauthenticated management routes can hijack the Jupyter backend in standalone HTTP mode
CVE-2026-77318 · GHSA-24pw-rf5p-mgp7 · published 2026-11-20
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.51%
- Fixed in
- 1.0.3
An attacker does not need the MCP_TOKEN to mutate the standalone MCP server's active backend connection. The attacker can stop the current notebook kernel through /api/stop, replace the configured runtime_url and document_url through /api/connect, and cause the MCP server to initiate Jupyter API and WebSocket traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure. For a same-network attacker, this is a direct unauthenticated state change against the HTTP listener. This defeats the documented standalone HTTP security boundary because the protected /mcp endpoint rejects missing credentials while adjacent management routes perform sensitive state changes without the same control.
Upgrade jupyter-mcp-server to 1.0.3 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Apply the same inbound authentication policy to every route mounted on the standalone HTTP app: 1. Require the MCP_TOKEN bearer token on /api/connect, /api/stop, /api/healthz, and any future custom route that reads or changes server state. 2. Bind standalone HTTP to 127.0.0.1 by default, and require an explicit host allowlist for non-loopback listeners. 3. Add regression tests proving that /api/connect and /api/stop reject missing bearer tokens and invalid bearer tokens.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| jupyter-mcp-server | PyPI | <= 1.0.2 | 1.0.3 |
- CriticalMarimo: Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution via Terminal WebSocket Authentication BypassmarimoExploited
- CriticalLangflow CORS misconfiguration enables Account Takeover and RCElangflowExploited
- HighLiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough FallbacklitellmExploited
- HighLangflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's FlowlangflowExploited
- CriticalTodoist MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding lets websites write and delete Todoist data through local MCP server@doist/todoist-mcp
- CriticalLangflow: Unauthenticated Flow Execution via Webhook Authentication Bypasslangflow
- CriticalJupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routesjupyter-mcp-server
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.