Jupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routes
CVE-2026-77359 · GHSA-9x8x-crjq-g64h · published 2026-11-20
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS score
- 9.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.50%
- Fixed in
- 1.0.3
The protected /mcp endpoint rejects forged Host and Origin values, but adjacent custom routes accept them and perform sensitive state changes. A web attacker can use DNS rebinding to reach a local, LAN, VPN, or Docker-published MCP listener from the victim's browser, stop the current notebook kernel through /api/stop, replace the configured runtime_url and document_url through /api/connect, and cause the MCP server to initiate Jupyter API and WebSocket traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Upgrade jupyter-mcp-server to 1.0.3 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Apply the same browser-origin security policy to every route mounted on the standalone HTTP app: 1. Enforce Host and Origin validation before custom routes parse request bodies or mutate global config. 2. Require the MCP_TOKEN bearer token on /api/connect, /api/stop, /api/healthz, and any future custom route that reads or changes server state. 3. Bind standalone HTTP to 127.0.0.1 by default, and require an explicit host allowlist for non-loopback listeners. 4. Add regression tests proving that /api/connect and /api/stop reject forged browser Host and Origin headers.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| jupyter-mcp-server | PyPI | <= 1.0.2 | 1.0.3 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.