Supabase Node Filters (String) Mode Allows PostgREST Filter Injection
GHSA-xrqg-3xcp-h45x · published 2026-09-16
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.1
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 2.40.1
The Supabase node's "Filters (String)" mode inserted its field into the query sent to the database with no escaping, and the field accepts expressions. Where a workflow builds it from untrusted input, whoever controls that input could widen the filter beyond the intended row: reading every row in the table, updating them all, or deleting them all. Confirmed for read and for delete, where a single request emptied the table.
Upgrade n8n to 2.40.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.80, 2.39.6, and 2.40.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Audit all workflows using the Supabase node's Filters (String) mode and identify any where the filter value is built from an expression referencing external or untrusted data. Replace Filters (String) with the Build Manually filter mode, which uses parameterized filter construction and is not affected by this issue. Restrict access to any workflow triggers (e.g. webhooks) that feed untrusted data into a Supabase Filters (String) field. Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. …
- CriticalLiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verificationlitellmExploited
- HighLiteLLM has a sandbox escape in custom-code guardraillitellmExploited
- HighLangflow affected by Remote Code Execution via validate_code() exec()langflowExploited
- CriticalJupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routesjupyter-mcp-server
- Criticalmem0ai Databricks vector store vulnerable to SQL injectionmem0ai
- CriticalFlowise NodeVM sandbox escape via puppeteer allowlist - authenticated RCE and arbitrary file read via Chromiumflowise, flowise-components
- Criticaln8n Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Expression Injectionn8n, n8nExploited
- Criticaln8n Has an Arbitrary File Read via Git Noden8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n: HTTP Request Node Pagination Prototype Pollution to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n Has an XML Node Prototype Pollution Patch Bypassn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n has XML Node Prototype Pollution that to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n has Prototype Pollution in XML Webhook Body Parser that Leads to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by n8n). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.