UTC
High

OpenClaw: `browser.request` still allows `POST /reset-profile` through the `operator.write` surface

CVE-2026-35653 · GHSA-xp9r-prpg-373r · published 2026-03-30 · updated 2026-04-10

Severity
High
CVSS score
8.1
Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
0.61%
Fixed in
2026.3.24
  • Exploitation Public proof of concept
  • Automatable No
  • Technical impact Total
  • CISA SSVC
What it is

The shipped release shows the following behavior difference: Control case: POST /profiles/create rejected before the request is dispatched to the browser control path Exploit case: POST /reset-profile not classified as a blocked mutation remains reachable through the browser.request surface reaches resetProfile(), which performs destructive profile-management operations The reached route has concrete side effects: stops the running browser if active closes the Playwright browser connection moves the profile's local userDataDir to Trash if it exists This is therefore a concrete authorization and policy gap on a real destructive profile-management route.

What to do

Upgrade openclaw to 2026.3.24 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.

Recommended fix: 1. Extend the persistent-profile mutation classifier to include POST /reset-profile. 2. Reuse the same centralized route classification everywhere the release currently relies on isPersistentBrowserProfileMutation(...), including: src/gateway/server-methods/browser.ts src/node-host/invoke-browser.ts 3. Add regression coverage with both: a deny control for POST /reset-profile on the lower-privilege browser.request surface an allow control for non-mutating browser profile reads 4. Review nearby profile-management routes for any other state-changing endpoints that are still omitted from the mutation classifier. 5.

Affected
PackageRegistryAffectedFixed in
openclawnpm< 2026.3.242026.3.24

The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.

Sources: GitHub Advisory Database, reviewed and malware advisories (CC BY 4.0, https://github.com/advisories); advisories published by Cursor (https://github.com/cursor/cursor/security/advisories); advisories published by OpenClaw (https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories); advisories published by vLLM (https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories); advisories published by Open WebUI (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories); advisories published by n8n (https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories); advisories published by Flowise (https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories); advisories published by Langflow (https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories); advisories published by the MCP Python SDK project (https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/security/advisories); advisories published by MLflow (https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/security/advisories); CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (CC0). Data as of 2026-11-22. ShieldMap describes how each problem works and how to fix it; it does not publish exploit code. Report a correction to [email protected].