PickleScan's pkgutil.resolve_name has a universal blocklist bypass
CVE-2026-3490 · GHSA-vvpj-8cmc-gx39 · published 2026-03-03 · updated 2026-06-18
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS score
- 10.0
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.82%
- Fixed in
- 1.0.4
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
This is a complete bypass of picklescan's security model. The entire blocklist — every module and function entry in unsafeglobals — is rendered ineffective. An attacker needs only use pkgutil.resolve_name as an indirection layer to call any Python function. This affects: HuggingFace Hub (uses picklescan) Any ML pipeline using picklescan for safety validation Any system relying on picklescan's blocklist to prevent malicious pickle execution
Upgrade picklescan to 1.0.4 or later.
1. Immediate: Add pkgutil to unsafeglobals: 2. Also block similar resolution functions: 3. Architectural: The blocklist approach cannot defend against indirect resolution gadgets. Even blocking pkgutil, an attacker could find other stdlib functions that resolve module attributes. Consider: Analyzing REDUCE arguments for suspicious strings (e.g., patterns matching "module:function") Treating unknown globals as dangerous by default Switching to an allowlist model
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| picklescan | PyPI | < 1.0.4 | 1.0.4 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.