Open WebUI: Forged model meta.knowledge allows cross-user file read and deletion
CVE-2026-54012 · GHSA-vjqm-6gcc-62cr · published 2026-06-17 · updated 2026-07-20
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.1
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.33%
- Fixed in
- 0.9.6
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
Security boundary crossed: file confidentiality and integrity. An authenticated attacker needs the workspace.models or workspace.modelsimport permission (or write access to an existing model) and a victim file ID. With those, for a file they do not own and cannot otherwise read, the attacker can: read the file's extracted text (up to 100000 characters per viewfile call from file.data.content), read the file's content via GET /api/v1/files/{id}/content, and delete the file via DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}.
Upgrade open-webui to 0.9.6 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Validate meta.knowledge on every model write path: create, update, and import. For entries with type == "file", require direct ownership, admin role, or before storing the entry. Validate the import payload before its surrounding try/except so a rejection surfaces as 403, not 500. Do not let viewfile() treat modelknowledge as an authorization bypass; it should still enforce ownership/admin/hasaccessto_file() per file ID. File deletion should require ownership, admin, or explicit write/delete access, not a read-derived model association.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| open-webui | PyPI | <= 0.9.5 | 0.9.6 |
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- HighOpen WebUI: Non-admin users can delete admin-owned external knowledge connections via knowledge base deletionopen-webui
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.