PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] `praisonai serve agents --api-key` is silently ignored — agent-invocation routes (`POST /agents`, `POST /agents/{ag
CVE-2026-55538 · GHSA-r7v3-x45f-g7hp · published 2026-08-25
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.45%
- Fixed in
- 4.6.58
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
Direct primitive: unauthenticated agent invocation despite a configured API key. Misleading control (aggravating): because the CLI advertises --api-key as authentication, operators may deliberately expose the service (e.g. --host 0.0.0.0, reverse proxy, n8n integration) believing it is protected, increasing the real-world likelihood of exposure. Downstream: exposed agents commonly hold LLM provider credentials, RAG/memory, browser/search, MCP, or shell/file tools; the bypass lets an attacker drive those capabilities. Baseline impact is unauthorized LLM cost + access to agent responses.
Upgrade praisonai to 4.6.58 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
When config["apikey"] is set, build a shared auth dependency and attach it to every agent-invocation / state-changing route in createagentsapp() and createunifiedapp() (dependencies=[Depends(verify)]). Reuse / unify with the existing verifytoken so the direct /agents routes and the /api/v1 routes share one mechanism, and wire the CLI --api-key into that mechanism (today it feeds nothing; verifytoken reads CALLSERVERTOKEN). Use constant-time comparison (hmac.comparedigest); verifytoken currently uses !=. Update discovery metadata from authmodes=["none"] to ["api-key","bearer"] for protected endpoints. Regression tests next to tests/unit/testserveunified.py: ; correct key succeeds.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| praisonai | PyPI | < 4.6.58 | 4.6.58 |
1 registered MCP server installs an affected version today, by the dependency versions a fresh install resolves.
- io.github.MervinPraison/praisonaipraisonai@2.3.42
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.