PraisonAI Slack app_mention bypasses configured user/channel authorization
CVE-2026-56835 · GHSA-qvpf-j64c-jmhr · published 2026-06-18 · updated 2026-07-20
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.21%
- Fixed in
- 4.6.59
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
An attacker needs the ability to cause Slack to deliver an app_mention event to the PraisonAI Slack app, such as by mentioning the bot in a channel where the app is present or by using Slack's invite-by-mention flow where applicable. When exploited, the attacker can submit arbitrary prompt text to the configured PraisonAI agent despite Slack bot allowlists or pairing policy. The downstream impact depends on the deployed agent and tools. PraisonAI's default bot config auto-approves safe tools and includes web, memory, scheduling, file, planning, and skill tools, so unauthorized invocation can affect confidentiality and integrity in real deployments.
Upgrade praisonai to 4.6.59 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Use one shared authorization preflight for every Slack ingress path before firing message hooks or invoking agents. Concrete patch direction: 1. Convert appmention events through converteventtomessage() or a dedicated equivalent that preserves sender, channel, text, timestamp, and thread metadata. 2. Set botmessage.channeltype = "slack" for appmention. 3. Run the same channel check, user allowlist check, and UnknownUserHandler.handle(...) policy used by handlemessage. 4. Only then strip the bot mention and invoke session.chat(...). 5.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| praisonai | PyPI | >= 3.11.0, <= 4.6.58 | 4.6.59 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.