n8n: MCP Browser HTTP Transport Exposes Unauthenticated Browser-Control Sessions
CVE-2026-54309 · GHSA-qrx8-25qr-5r7v · published 2026-06-16 · updated 2026-07-20
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 10.0
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.55%
- Fixed in
- 2.26.2
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
When @n8n/mcp-browser is run in HTTP transport mode, the MCP endpoint accepts session initialization and tool invocation requests without any authentication. Any network-reachable client, or any website visited by the user, can establish an MCP session and invoke browser-control tools. Where the n8n AI Browser Bridge extension is installed and a browser connection is active, an unauthenticated caller can access browser-control capabilities including navigation, JavaScript evaluation, and cookie and storage access against the user's real browser profile. This issue only affects instances where @n8n/mcp-browser is run with the HTTP transport (--transport http).
Upgrade n8n to 2.26.2 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.25.7, and 2.26.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Avoid running @n8n/mcp-browser with the HTTP transport; use the default stdio transport instead. If HTTP transport is required, restrict network access to the listening port to trusted clients only using host-based firewall rules. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.