ha-mcp: Add-on settings and policy routes are reachable without authentication at the bare root path
GHSA-q855-8rh5-jfgq · published 2026-07-07
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 7.10.0
Without authentication, a caller that reaches :9583 — a peer on the local network, a reverse proxy/tunnel that forwards the bare root path (e.g. a whole-host Cloudflared config), or a CSRF POST from a page open in a LAN browser — can read or change which MCP tools are exposed, toggle feature flags, list/view/restore/delete backups, restart the add-on, and (with Tool Security Policies enabled) read and rewrite the approval policy, disabling the human-approval gate on gated tools. There is no access to Home Assistant data, entities, or credentials, and no code execution. All effects are confined to the add-on's own configuration and lifecycle and are recoverable.
Upgrade ha-mcp to 7.10.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Fixed in PR homeassistant-ai/ha-mcp#1508 (merged to master): the root-mounted add-on routes are restricted to Home Assistant ingress, which always originates from the Supervisor (172.30.32.2); every other caller receives 403. Direct and remote access continue to use the settings UI under the MCP secret path (…/ /settings), so the "Open Web UI" button, Cloudflared, and the Webhook Proxy add-on are unaffected. The fix will ship in the next stable add-on release.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| ha-mcp | PyPI | < 7.10.0 | 7.10.0 |
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- HighLiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough FallbacklitellmExploited
- HighLangflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's FlowlangflowExploited
- CriticalTodoist MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding lets websites write and delete Todoist data through local MCP server@doist/todoist-mcp
- CriticalLangflow: Unauthenticated Flow Execution via Webhook Authentication Bypasslangflow
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.