UTC
High

@sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp: HTTP transport accepts unauthenticated requests despite a configured MCP_API_KEY

CVE-2026-62264 · GHSA-q344-5v34-gm84 · published 2026-10-29

Severity
High
CVSS score
7.5
Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
0.45%
Fixed in
3.0.1
  • Exploitation No known exploitation
  • Automatable Yes
  • Technical impact Partial
  • CISA SSVC
What it is

When @sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp is run as an HTTP server (MCPTRANSPORT=http), it reads the MCPAPIKEY environment variable and logs header on incoming requests. The key was read into a variable and never enforced on the request path. As a result, the /mcp endpoint accepted unauthenticated requests. Combined with the default bind address of 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces), any client able to reach the port could invoke every PDF tool and read the contents of any PDF the server process could open anywhere on the host. URL-based sources also enable limited SSRF (private/loopback addresses are blocked by default unless --allow-private-ips is set).

What to do

Upgrade @sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp to 3.0.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.

Fixed in @sylphx/[email protected]. The fix enforces the X-API-Key header with a constant-time comparison (rejecting missing/mismatched keys with HTTP 401), changes the default bind host to 127.0.0.1 (loopback), and emits a startup warning when binding a non-loopback host without an API key.

If you cannot upgrade yet

For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately: Bind to loopback only: MCPHTTPHOST=127.0.0.1. Place a reverse proxy in front that enforces authentication. Use the default stdio transport instead of HTTP. Restrict filesystem reach with --allow-dir / MCPPDFALLOWEDDIRS. Reported privately by novice-22** via responsible disclosure.

Affected
PackageRegistryAffectedFixed in
@sylphx/pdf-reader-mcpnpm>= 2.2.0, < 3.0.13.0.1

The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.

Sources: GitHub Advisory Database, reviewed and malware advisories (CC BY 4.0, https://github.com/advisories); advisories published by Cursor (https://github.com/cursor/cursor/security/advisories); advisories published by OpenClaw (https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories); advisories published by vLLM (https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories); advisories published by Open WebUI (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories); advisories published by n8n (https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories); advisories published by Flowise (https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories); advisories published by Langflow (https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories); advisories published by the MCP Python SDK project (https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/security/advisories); advisories published by MLflow (https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/security/advisories); CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (CC0). Data as of 2026-11-22. ShieldMap describes how each problem works and how to fix it; it does not publish exploit code. Report a correction to [email protected].