@sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp: HTTP transport accepts unauthenticated requests despite a configured MCP_API_KEY
CVE-2026-62264 · GHSA-q344-5v34-gm84 · published 2026-10-29
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.45%
- Fixed in
- 3.0.1
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
When @sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp is run as an HTTP server (MCPTRANSPORT=http), it reads the MCPAPIKEY environment variable and logs header on incoming requests. The key was read into a variable and never enforced on the request path. As a result, the /mcp endpoint accepted unauthenticated requests. Combined with the default bind address of 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces), any client able to reach the port could invoke every PDF tool and read the contents of any PDF the server process could open anywhere on the host. URL-based sources also enable limited SSRF (private/loopback addresses are blocked by default unless --allow-private-ips is set).
Upgrade @sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp to 3.0.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Fixed in @sylphx/[email protected]. The fix enforces the X-API-Key header with a constant-time comparison (rejecting missing/mismatched keys with HTTP 401), changes the default bind host to 127.0.0.1 (loopback), and emits a startup warning when binding a non-loopback host without an API key.
For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately: Bind to loopback only: MCPHTTPHOST=127.0.0.1. Place a reverse proxy in front that enforces authentication. Use the default stdio transport instead of HTTP. Restrict filesystem reach with --allow-dir / MCPPDFALLOWEDDIRS. Reported privately by novice-22** via responsible disclosure.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| @sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp | npm | >= 2.2.0, < 3.0.1 | 3.0.1 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.