n8n: Cross-Issuer Token Exchange Account Binding via Subject-Only Identity Resolution
CVE-2026-59208 · GHSA-mq3m-f8x3-579w · published 2026-07-22
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.6
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.27%
- Fixed in
- 2.28.1
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
When an n8n instance is configured with more than one trusted token-exchange issuer, external identities are resolved to local accounts using only the JWT sub claim, ignoring the issuer (iss). As a result, two different issuers that emit the same subject value map to the same local account. An attacker who can obtain a valid token from one trusted issuer with a sub matching a victim registered under a different issuer can authenticate as that victim and access their account. This issue only affects instances where the token exchange feature is enabled and more than one trusted external issuer is configured.
Upgrade n8n to 2.28.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n version 2.28.1. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: If multiple trusted issuers are not required, reduce the token exchange configuration to a single trusted issuer. Disable the token exchange feature entirely if it is not in active use. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.