OpenClaw has a Telegram webhook request forgery (missing `channels.telegram.webhookSecret`) → auth bypass
CVE-2026-25474 · GHSA-mp5h-m6qj-6292 · published 2026-02-17 · updated 2026-02-19
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.24%
- Fixed in
- 2026.2.1
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
If an attacker can reach the webhook endpoint, they may be able to send forged updates that are processed as if they came from Telegram. Depending on enabled commands/tools and configuration, this could lead to unintended bot actions.
Upgrade openclaw to 2026.2.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
ca92597e1f9593236ad86810b66633144b69314d (config validation: webhookUrl requires webhookSecret) Defense-in-depth / supporting fixes: 5643a934799dc523ec2ef18c007e1aa2c386b670 (default webhook listener bind host to loopback) 3cbcba10cf30c2ffb898f0d8c7dfb929f15f8930 (bound webhook request body size/time) 633fe8b9c17f02fcc68ecdb5ec212a5ace932f09 (runtime guard: reject webhook startup when secret is missing/empty) Thanks @yueyueL for reporting.
Set a strong channels.telegram.webhookSecret and ensure your reverse proxy forwards the X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token header unchanged. Restrict network access to the webhook endpoint (for example bind to loopback and only expose via a reverse proxy).
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| openclaw | npm | < 2026.2.1 | 2026.2.1 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.