n8n has Arbitrary File Read via Python Code Node Sandbox Escape
CVE-2026-27494 · GHSA-mmgg-m5j7-f83h · published 2026-02-25 · updated 2026-02-27
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 9.9
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.41%
- Fixed in
- 2.10.1
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could use the Python Code node to escape the sandbox. The sandbox did not sufficiently restrict access to certain built-in Python objects, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate file contents or achieve RCE. On instances using internal Task Runners (default runner mode), this could result in full compromise of the n8n host. On instances using external Task Runners, the attacker might gain access to or impact other task executed on the Task Runner. Task Runners must be enabled using N8NRUNNERSENABLED=true.
Upgrade n8n to 2.10.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.10.1, 2.9.3, and 1.123.22. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only. Disable the Code node by adding n8n-nodes-base.code to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.