Langflow: Weak Fernet Key via random.seed()
CVE-2026-9205 · GHSA-jxw3-mjmx-3pqm · published 2026-10-05
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS score
- 9.1
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.30%
- Fixed in
- 1.10.1
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
All stored user credentials are at risk in any Langflow deployment where an attacker can read the secretkey file. Combined with the MCP path traversal vulnerability, this creates a complete remote credential exfiltration chain requiring only a low-privilege account: OpenAI, Anthropic, and other LLM provider API keys stored by any user are decryptable Database connection strings and passwords stored as credentials are exposed OAuth tokens and webhook secrets stored via the Variables UI are exposed All users on the instance are affected — credentials are stored per-user in the shared database but all encrypted under the same instance-wide SECRETKEY In multi-tenant or enterprise Langflow deploy…
Upgrade langflow to 1.10.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Fixed in v1.10.1 by PR #13704 (commit 094694d3f2). ensurefernetkey() ( ) no longer seeds Python's non-cryptographic random module for short SECRETKEY values. The 32-byte key is now derived deterministically with SHA-256: Backward-compatible decryption of ciphertext written under the old PRNG-derived key is preserved via getfernetfordecryption(), which returns a MultiFernet trying the new SHA-256 key first and a legacy key second. The legacy key is reproduced with a local random.Random(secretkey) instance (not the global random module), so it can decrypt old data without ever being usable to derive new keys or mutating global PRNG state. All new encryption goes through the SHA-256 key only.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| langflow | PyPI | <= 1.10.0 | 1.10.1 |
- CriticalLiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verificationlitellmExploited
- Criticaln8n Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Expression Injectionn8n, n8nExploited
- HighLiteLLM has a sandbox escape in custom-code guardraillitellmExploited
- CriticalJupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routesjupyter-mcp-server
- Criticalmem0ai Databricks vector store vulnerable to SQL injectionmem0ai
- CriticalFlowise NodeVM sandbox escape via puppeteer allowlist - authenticated RCE and arbitrary file read via Chromiumflowise, flowise-components
- CriticalUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Langflow via Public Flow Build EndpointlangflowExploited
- CriticalLangflow CORS misconfiguration enables Account Takeover and RCElangflowExploited
- CriticalLangflow Unauth RCElangflow, langflow-baseExploited
- HighLangflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's FlowlangflowExploited
- HighLangflow affected by Remote Code Execution via validate_code() exec()langflowExploited
- CriticalMCP Path Traversal Allows Full-Filesystem Read and JWT Secret Exfiltration Leading to Account Takeoverlangflow, langflow-base
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.