UTC
Critical

Langflow: Weak Fernet Key via random.seed()

CVE-2026-9205 · GHSA-jxw3-mjmx-3pqm · published 2026-10-05

Severity
Critical
CVSS score
9.1
Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
0.30%
Fixed in
1.10.1
  • Exploitation No known exploitation
  • Automatable No
  • Technical impact Total
  • CISA SSVC
What it is

All stored user credentials are at risk in any Langflow deployment where an attacker can read the secretkey file. Combined with the MCP path traversal vulnerability, this creates a complete remote credential exfiltration chain requiring only a low-privilege account: OpenAI, Anthropic, and other LLM provider API keys stored by any user are decryptable Database connection strings and passwords stored as credentials are exposed OAuth tokens and webhook secrets stored via the Variables UI are exposed All users on the instance are affected — credentials are stored per-user in the shared database but all encrypted under the same instance-wide SECRETKEY In multi-tenant or enterprise Langflow deploy…

What to do

Upgrade langflow to 1.10.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.

Fixed in v1.10.1 by PR #13704 (commit 094694d3f2). ensurefernetkey() ( ) no longer seeds Python's non-cryptographic random module for short SECRETKEY values. The 32-byte key is now derived deterministically with SHA-256: Backward-compatible decryption of ciphertext written under the old PRNG-derived key is preserved via getfernetfordecryption(), which returns a MultiFernet trying the new SHA-256 key first and a legacy key second. The legacy key is reproduced with a local random.Random(secretkey) instance (not the global random module), so it can decrypt old data without ever being usable to derive new keys or mutating global PRNG state. All new encryption goes through the SHA-256 key only.

Affected
PackageRegistryAffectedFixed in
langflowPyPI<= 1.10.01.10.1

The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.

Sources: GitHub Advisory Database, reviewed and malware advisories (CC BY 4.0, https://github.com/advisories); advisories published by Cursor (https://github.com/cursor/cursor/security/advisories); advisories published by OpenClaw (https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories); advisories published by vLLM (https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories); advisories published by Open WebUI (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories); advisories published by n8n (https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories); advisories published by Flowise (https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories); advisories published by Langflow (https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories); advisories published by the MCP Python SDK project (https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/security/advisories); advisories published by MLflow (https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/security/advisories); CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (CC0). Data as of 2026-11-22. ShieldMap describes how each problem works and how to fix it; it does not publish exploit code. Report a correction to [email protected].