n8n: Denial of Service via ZIP decompression in webhook workflow
CVE-2026-54314 · GHSA-jqpw-qww5-cj4c · published 2026-06-16 · updated 2026-07-20
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.9
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.55%
- Fixed in
- 2.24.0
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
The Compression node's Decompress operation expanded attacker-controlled archives into memory without enforcing limits on decompressed output size. An unauthenticated attacker could send a small compressed archive to a public webhook workflow using this node, causing the n8n process to terminate due to memory exhaustion and disrupting all workflows in the same instance.
Upgrade n8n to 2.24.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n version 2.24.0. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability. The fix introduces configurable limits on decompressed output size ( ).
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Disable the Compression node by adding n8n-nodes-base.compression to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable. Restrict public webhook workflows that accept archive file uploads to authenticated endpoints only. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| n8n | npm | < 2.24.0 | 2.24.0 |
- CriticalLiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verificationlitellmExploited
- HighLiteLLM has a sandbox escape in custom-code guardraillitellmExploited
- HighLangflow affected by Remote Code Execution via validate_code() exec()langflowExploited
- CriticalJupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routesjupyter-mcp-server
- Criticalmem0ai Databricks vector store vulnerable to SQL injectionmem0ai
- CriticalFlowise NodeVM sandbox escape via puppeteer allowlist - authenticated RCE and arbitrary file read via Chromiumflowise, flowise-components
- Criticaln8n Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Expression Injectionn8n, n8nExploited
- Criticaln8n Has an Arbitrary File Read via Git Noden8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n: HTTP Request Node Pagination Prototype Pollution to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n Has an XML Node Prototype Pollution Patch Bypassn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n has XML Node Prototype Pollution that to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n has Prototype Pollution in XML Webhook Body Parser that Leads to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.