Workflow Activation Allows Trigger Nodes to Use Credentials the Publisher Cannot Access
GHSA-h59h-rf6m-7jp5 · published 2026-11-13
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 3.2.2
When a workflow was activated, n8n registered its trigger nodes with the connected services using the credentials set on those nodes. Activation did not check that the user publishing the workflow had access to those credentials. A member who knew the ID of another user's credential could activate a workflow whose trigger used it. n8n then created or deleted webhooks on the connected service with that credential's privileges, and delivered events from resources the member chose to the member's workflow.
Upgrade n8n to 3.2.2 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.96, 2.47.6, 2.48.3 and 3.2.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. Audit active workflows for trigger nodes that use credentials owned by another user, and deactivate any that are not expected. Review the webhooks registered on connected services such as GitLab and GitHub, and remove any that are not expected. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by n8n). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.