OpenClaw: Channel read actions could skip target allowlists
GHSA-g7fw-3gjp-g5hf · published 2026-10-05
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 2026.8.1
A lower-trust sender or steered agent with access to a channel read action could retrieve content or metadata from a target excluded by the operator's channel allowlist. Practical impact depends on the bot account's platform permissions.
Upgrade @openclaw/feishu to 2026.8.1 or later, and @openclaw/googlechat to 2026.8.1 or later, and @openclaw/matrix to 2026.8.1 or later, and @openclaw/msteams to 2026.8.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The first stable patched version is 2026.8.1.
upgrade each affected channel plugin to 2026.8.1 or later. Before upgrading, disable explicit-target read actions or limit the connected bot account to allowed channels at the platform level.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| @openclaw/feishu | npm | < 2026.8.1 | 2026.8.1 |
| @openclaw/googlechat | npm | < 2026.8.1 | 2026.8.1 |
| @openclaw/matrix | npm | < 2026.8.1 | 2026.8.1 |
| @openclaw/msteams | npm | < 2026.8.1 | 2026.8.1 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.