MCP Gateway: Authority-injection and JWT/session bypass via the unauthenticated router hair-pin "router-key" / "mcp-init-host" path
GHSA-g53w-w6mj-hrpp · published 2026-05-19 · updated 2026-07-21
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS score
- 9.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 0.7.0
The MCP router (ext_proc) exposes an initialize-method code path that, when a request carries an mcp-init-host header, bypasses the gateway JWT session validator and rewrites the upstream :authority header to whatever the caller chooses, gated only by a single shared header value (router-key). The shared value is a literal string (secret-api-key) baked into cmd/mcp-broker-router/main.go as a fall-back default, and in controller-managed deployments, a SHA-256 truncation of the MCPGatewayExtension UID — a non-secret value visible to anyone with get permission on the resource, and additionally exposed in argv because it is passed to the broker-router container via --mcp-router-key=....
Upgrade github.com/Kuadrant/mcp-gateway to 0.7.0 or later.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/Kuadrant/mcp-gateway | Go | < 0.7.0 | 0.7.0 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.