Community Package Install Validation Bypass via PubSub in Queue Mode Deployments
GHSA-fmmv-p585-7c8x · published 2026-09-16
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 2.40.1
In deployments using Redis for scaling (queue mode), the internal handler that installs a community package applied none of the checks the normal install path performs — name and prefix validation, the install-permission check, checksum verification, and the npm safety check. Anyone able to write to that Redis instance could have n8n download, install and load any npm package on every instance in the cluster, with no n8n account, while that action is otherwise restricted to the instance owner.
Upgrade n8n to 2.40.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.80, 2.39.6, and 2.40.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Restrict access to the Redis instance to only trusted n8n components, using authentication and network-level controls (firewall rules, private networking). Disable community package installation by setting N8N_COMMUNITY_PACKAGES_ENABLED=false if community nodes are not required. Audit installed community packages for any unexpected entries and remove them. Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by n8n). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.