Grackle: Fail-open authorization in the MCP tool layer lets scoped agents perform cross-task and cross-session mutations (IDOR)
GHSA-f9ff-5x35-7gfw · published 2026-07-02
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.7
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- No fix yet
Authorization for scoped (agent) MCP callers is enforced inline, per tool, and is applied inconsistently — several mutating tools silently omit the ancestry/workspace check that their siblings perform. Because the MCP server authenticates all outbound gRPC with the full server API key and the backend gRPC handlers perform no caller-based authorization, the MCP tool layer is the sole authorization boundary. A malicious or prompt-injected scoped agent can therefore perform cross-task and cross-session operations it should not be allowed to (an IDOR / privilege-boundary bypass). This advisory bundles the audit's Systemic Pattern A findings: F2, F6, F7, F12 (and the duplicate F19).
No fixed release is listed yet for @grackle-ai/mcp. Limit what it can reach, or stop using it until a fix ships, and follow the source advisory for updates.
Systemic fix: enforce scope centrally in the CallToolRequest dispatcher (mcp-server.ts) via a per-tool targetTaskIdArg / targetSessionIdArg descriptor so any tool that targets a task/session fails closed unless the caller is an ancestor (or self). Immediately, add assertCallerIsAncestor (or self-or-ancestor) to task_update, task_delete, task_resume, session_kill, session_resume, mirroring task_complete/task_start. F7: do not fail open on empty workspaceId — treat a scoped non-root caller with no workspace as having access to no workspace; apply the task_show membership check whenever the caller is scoped and not ROOT_TASK_ID; add a per-id membership check to schedule_show. …
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| @grackle-ai/mcp | npm | <= 0.132.1 | No fix yet |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.