n8n: Per-Resource OAuth Consent Bypass via Unbound Refresh Token Resource Substitution
CVE-2026-86073 · GHSA-cw9w-vv67-hf73 · published 2026-09-10
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.9
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.39%
- Fixed in
- 2.38.1
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
The OAuth token endpoint bound an authorization code's first access token to the consented resource, but not its refresh token. Refreshing only checked that the requested resource was registered, not that it matched the original grant. An OAuth client approved for one workflow could refresh with a different workflow's URL and get a valid, unapproved token for it. The patch binds refresh tokens to the granted resource and rejects mismatches. Exploitation requires the attacker to register an OAuth client, convince an authenticated user to approve that client for one known protected resource, and know the URL of a second protected resource that the consenting user is permitted to execute.
Upgrade n8n to 2.38.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.38.1 and 2.37.7. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. Deactivate MCP Trigger, form, and webhook workflows that are protected by the n8n OAuth server if they are not required. Audit connected OAuth clients and revoke any that are not recognized or no longer needed. Require re-authorization for all existing OAuth clients after upgrading, as previously issued refresh tokens did not store the original resource binding. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.