OpenClaw Twilio voice-call webhook auth bypass when ngrok loopback compatibility is enabled
CVE-2026-29606 · GHSA-c37p-4qqg-3p76 · published 2026-02-18 · updated 2026-03-06
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.33%
- Fixed in
- 2026.2.14
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
This issue is limited to configurations that explicitly enable and expose the voice-call webhook endpoint. Not affected by default: The voice-call extension is optional and disabled by default. The bypass only applied when tunnel.allowNgrokFreeTierLoopbackBypass was explicitly enabled. Exploitation required the webhook to be reachable (typically via a public ngrok URL during development). Worst case (when exposed and the option was enabled): An external attacker could send forged requests to the publicly reachable webhook endpoint that would be accepted without a valid X-Twilio-Signature.
Upgrade openclaw to 2026.2.14 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
allowNgrokFreeTierLoopbackBypass no longer bypasses signature verification. It only enables trusting forwarded headers on loopback so the public ngrok URL can be reconstructed for correct signature validation. Fix commit(s): ff11d8793b90c52f8d84dae3fbb99307da51b5c9 Thanks @p80n-sec for reporting.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| openclaw | npm | < 2026.2.14 | 2026.2.14 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.