SSRF Protection Bypass via SearXNG Tool Allows Member Users to Read Internal Service Responses
GHSA-9rp2-wm75-c5fj · published 2026-08-05
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 2.34.1
The SearXNG Agent tool sent requests to the user-supplied API URL using a raw HTTP client that did not route through n8n's centralized SSRF protection. On instances with N8N_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=true, an authenticated user user could configure a SearXNG credential whose API URL pointed to an internal host, cause the n8n server to connect to that host when the Agent executed a search, and read the response content back through the Agent chat output. Exploitation requires an authenticated user account with permission to create SearXNG credentials and configure a personal agent.
Upgrade n8n to 2.34.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.31.5, and 2.32.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. Disable the SearXNG tool by blocking access to the relevant LangChain node. Restrict network egress from the n8n host to block access to internal and link-local address ranges at the network level. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by n8n). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.