Deprecated Code Nodes Allow Code Execution in the n8n Main Process
GHSA-9p7v-45m2-wxgj · published 2026-10-28
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.7
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 3.0.1
The Function and Function Item nodes run user code in the vm2 sandbox, and the LangChain Code node runs user code in the n8n main process. An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could use these nodes to execute arbitrary code in the n8n main process, outside the task runner isolation that applies to the Code node.
Upgrade n8n to 3.0.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
In n8n versions 2.42.6, 2.43.3, 2.44.0 and 3.0.1, the Function, Function Item, and LangChain Code nodes are deprecated and blocked by default. Saving a workflow that adds or modifies one of these nodes is rejected; workflows already saved with these nodes continue to run unchanged. Administrators should review existing workflows and replace these nodes with the Code node. The block can be disabled with N8N_DEPRECATED_NODES_BLOCK=false, which restores the vulnerable behavior. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Add n8n-nodes-base.function, n8n-nodes-base.functionItem, and @n8n/n8n-nodes-langchain.code to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable to prevent these nodes from being used. Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
- CriticalLiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verificationlitellmExploited
- HighLiteLLM has a sandbox escape in custom-code guardraillitellmExploited
- HighLangflow affected by Remote Code Execution via validate_code() exec()langflowExploited
- CriticalJupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routesjupyter-mcp-server
- Criticalmem0ai Databricks vector store vulnerable to SQL injectionmem0ai
- CriticalFlowise NodeVM sandbox escape via puppeteer allowlist - authenticated RCE and arbitrary file read via Chromiumflowise, flowise-components
- Criticaln8n Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Expression Injectionn8n, n8nExploited
- Criticaln8n Has an Arbitrary File Read via Git Noden8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n: HTTP Request Node Pagination Prototype Pollution to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n Has an XML Node Prototype Pollution Patch Bypassn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n has XML Node Prototype Pollution that to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n has Prototype Pollution in XML Webhook Body Parser that Leads to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by n8n). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.