Execute Sub-workflow `source: url` / `source: localFile` Bypasses Shared-Workflow Credential Guard
GHSA-8crx-5h96-q72q · published 2026-10-14
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.1
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 2.44.1
When a workflow is shared for editing, n8n checks on save that the editor does not add credentials they may not use. The Execute Sub-workflow node can load its sub-workflow from a URL or a local file at run time, and the check never saw that content. An editor of a shared workflow can therefore have credentials of the workflow's project resolved by a sub-workflow they serve, and receive the decrypted values.
Upgrade n8n to 2.44.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.85, 2.44.1, and 2.43.5. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. Audit shared workflows for Execute Sub-workflow nodes using source: url or source: localFile parameters and remove or restrict them. Remove editor access from any users who are not fully trusted until the instance is patched. Apply network-level controls to prevent the n8n process from reaching attacker-controlled infrastructure if outbound HTTP cannot be fully restricted. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by n8n). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.