UTC
Critical

PraisonAI call server exposes unauthenticated agent listing, invocation, and deletion when CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is unset

CVE-2026-47396 · GHSA-86qc-r5v2-v6x6 · published 2026-05-29

Severity
Critical
CVSS score
9.8
Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
0.43%
Fixed in
4.6.40
  • Exploitation Public proof of concept
  • Automatable Yes
  • Technical impact Total
  • CISA SSVC
What it is

If an operator runs the PraisonAI call server without explicitly setting CALLSERVERTOKEN, any reachable client may be able to: enumerate registered agents; read agent metadata; read agent instruction text; invoke agents; trigger downstream tools or external integrations connected to agents; consume model or API budget through repeated invocation; unregister agents and disrupt availability. The impact depends on the deployed agents and their connected tools. For agents wired to external APIs, internal systems, local tools, or privileged actions, this creates a remote unauthenticated control surface. The issue is not limited to information disclosure.

What to do

Upgrade praisonai to 4.6.40 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.

Recommended fixes: 1. Fail closed when CALLSERVERTOKEN is unset. The authentication dependency should reject requests unless authentication is explicitly configured and a valid token is supplied. 2. Refuse to mount the agent invocation router unless authentication is configured. 3. If unauthenticated mode is intended for local development, bind to 127.0.0.1 by default when CALLSERVERTOKEN is absent. 4. Add a startup error or highly visible warning when the call server is started without authentication. 5. Add regression tests that assert 401 Unauthorized for all sensitive agent routes when no valid token is supplied. 6.

Affected
PackageRegistryAffectedFixed in
praisonaiPyPI<= 4.6.394.6.40
Downstream in the Official MCP Registry

1 registered MCP server installs an affected version today, by the dependency versions a fresh install resolves.

  • io.github.MervinPraison/praisonaipraisonai@2.3.42
See the trace →

The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.

Sources: GitHub Advisory Database, reviewed and malware advisories (CC BY 4.0, https://github.com/advisories); advisories published by Cursor (https://github.com/cursor/cursor/security/advisories); advisories published by OpenClaw (https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories); advisories published by vLLM (https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories); advisories published by Open WebUI (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories); advisories published by n8n (https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories); advisories published by Flowise (https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories); advisories published by Langflow (https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories); advisories published by the MCP Python SDK project (https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/security/advisories); advisories published by MLflow (https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/security/advisories); CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (CC0). Data as of 2026-11-22. ShieldMap describes how each problem works and how to fix it; it does not publish exploit code. Report a correction to [email protected].