Fickling has a detection bypass via stdlib network-protocol constructors
GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr · published 2026-02-20 · updated 2026-02-23
- Severity
- Low
- CVSS score
- 2.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 0.1.8
An attacker distributing a malicious pickle file (e.g. a crafted ML model checkpoint) can silently: Enumerate victims -- receive a TCP callback every time the pickle is loaded, including in sandboxed environments Exfiltrate host identity -- victim IP, hostname (via SMTP EHLO), and service banners are sent to the attacker's server Probe internal services (SSRF) -- if the victim host can reach internal SMTP relays, IMAP stores, or FTP servers, the pickle probes those services on the attacker's behalf Establish a covert channel -- protocol handshakes carry attacker-controlled bytes through a channel fickling explicitly labels safe The islikelysafe() helper (fickling/analysis.py:468-474) and the…
Upgrade fickling to 0.1.8 or later.
fickling/fickle.py (lines 41-97) defines UNSAFEIMPORTS, the primary blocklist. fickling/analysis.py (lines 229-248) defines the parallel UnsafeImportsML.UNSAFEMODULES dict. Both omitted the following stdlib network-protocol modules whose constructors open a TCP socket at instantiation time: | Module | Class | Default port | Constructor side-effect | |---|---|---|---| | smtplib | SMTP | 25 | TCP connect, reads SMTP banner, sends EHLO | | imaplib | IMAP4 | 143 | TCP connect, reads IMAP capability banner | | ftplib | FTP | 21 | TCP connect, reads FTP welcome banner | | poplib | POP3 | 110 | TCP connect, reads POP3 greeting | | telnetlib | Telnet | 23 | TCP connect | | nntplib | NNTP | 119 | TCP…
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| fickling | PyPI | <= 0.1.7 | 0.1.8 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.